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INTRODUCTION
Independent contractors constitute a large number of the
However, the misclassification of
American workforce. 1
employees as independent contractors is a large problem
affecting our nation. 2 Although state and federal jurisdictions
have passed statutes to prevent the intentional and accidental
misclassification of employees, the issue is still prevalent. 3
Misclassified workers are deprived of many protections, such
as workers compensation, unemployment benefits, earned
vacation time, pensions, and sick leave. 4 Furthermore,
misclassified workers fall outside of the protection of most if
not all wage and hour laws designed to protect employees. 5
From an employer’s perspective, there are many
incentives to classify workers as independent contractors. 6 For
example, employers can dodge various financial and legal
obligations by hiring independent contractors. 7 The financial
savings alone would appeal to most people as a sensible and
business savvy decision. However, the constant change in law
regarding who is considered an employee versus who is
considered an independent contractor has created confusion
for employers, workers, legislatures, and the judicial system. 8
California’s latest case to weigh in on this issue comes
from the Second District Court of Appeal in Dynamex. 9 In that
1. Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf (last visited Jan. 8,
2015).
2. Francois Carre & Randall Wilson, The Social and Economic Costs of
Employee Misclassification in Construction (Dec. 17, 2004).
3. See Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the
Economic Harm of Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 111, 112
(Spring 2009) (discussing the prevalence of employee misclassification).
4. See Carre, supra note 2, at 9.
5. See Carre, supra note 2, at 9.
6. See Carre, supra note 2, at 8–9.
7. See Carre, supra note 2, at 8–9.
8. See infra Part II.
9. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 4th 718,
review granted January 28, 2015, S222732. (Ct. App. 2014).
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case, the Second District unanimously agreed that the
plaintiffs of the case correctly relied upon the definition of
“employee” as found in California’s Industrial Welfare
Commission (IWC) wage order to determine who could be
included in a class action lawsuit against the defendant. 10 The
Dynamex court based its decision upon the ruling in Martinez
v. Combs, a California Supreme Court case that used the IWC’s
wage order to define who is an “employee.” 11 The Martinez
definition included three alternative and mutually exclusive
definitions for employee: “(a) to exercise control over the wages,
hours or working conditions, or (b) to suffer or permit to work,
or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law employment
relationship.” 12 On January 28, 2015, the California Supreme
Court granted review of the case.
The Dynamex defendants, however, argued that the
correct definition of employee should be founded on previous
common law principles, specifically the “right to control” test
set forth by the California Supreme Court in S.G. Borello &
Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (Borello). 13
Borello’s “right to control” test looks at whether an employer
has the right to assert control over “the manner and means of
Additionally, the
accomplishing the results desired.” 14
California Supreme Court added several other factors for
consideration; such as the specific type of occupation engaged
in and the length of time services are to be performed. 15
The Dynamex decision has created a sudden influx of class
action lawsuits regarding the new test to determine
independent contractor status. 16 However, the California
Supreme Court recently granted review of Dynamex on
10. Id. at 722.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 728 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 729.
14. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404
(Cal. 1989).
15. Id. at 404.
16. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Siegel, Controversial Dynamex Case Regarding
Misclassification of Independent Contractors to be Reviewed by California
Supreme Court, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.natlawreview
.com/article/controversial-dynamex-case-regarding-misclassificationindependent-contractors-to-be; Jessica Perry and Lauri Damrell, Think Your
Workers are Independent Contractors? Not So Fast Says DOL, EMP. L. & LITIG.
BLOG (Oct. 16, 2015), http://blogs.orrick.com/employment/tag/dynamexoperations-west-v-superior-court/.
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January 28, 2015. 17
This Comment will analyze the two opposing viewpoints
and introduce new considerations and solutions to fix
misclassification problems. To determine which definition of
“employee” should be used, California courts should look at the
history of employee classification and the benefits and
downfalls of choosing one definition over the other.
Part I of this Comment will look at the history of
California’s attempts to address employer/employee
relationships both legislatively and judicially. 18 Part II will
identify the legal issues surrounding this topic. 19 Part III will
analyze California’s two present tests for determining the
employment relationship. 20 Lastly, Part IV will propose a new
test that can best encompass the many different types of
employment arrangements in California. 21
I. BACKGROUND
A. Misclassification of Employees as Independent
Contractors
The misclassification of employees is a serious and
widespread issue not only in California, but also across the
nation. 22 It is important to understand why employers would
rather have independent contractors rather than employees.
Employers typically use independent contractors to reduce
their overhead costs. 23 When dealing with independent
contractors, employers do not have to follow some of the wage,
hour, and working condition laws that normally protect
regular employees. 24 Furthermore, independent contractors
17. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 341 P.3d 438 (2015).
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. U.S.
Gov’t
Accountability
Office,
GAO-09-717,
Employee
Misclassification Improved Coordination, Outreach, and Targeting Could Better
Ensure Detection and Prevention, at 12 (2009) (providing statistics regarding
the number of employees who are misclassified as independent contractors and
the financial effect of the misclassification).
23. Michael Carlin, Discrimination Against Disabled Contractors Under the
Rehabilitation Act, 34 WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 285 (Spring 2013) (discussing the
reasons why employers like hiring independent contractors).
24. See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 112 (discussing the harm suffered by
misclassification of employees).
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are not protected by workers compensation, receive no benefits,
and are not protected by anti-discrimination laws. 25
Employers may save by classifying their workers as
independent contractors, but in doing so they harm the worker,
the state, and the economy. 26 State governments are denied
potential income tax revenues because employers do not
withhold state and federal taxes from independent
Additionally, independent contractors are
contractors. 27
known to under-report income on their 1099 income tax
Furthermore, employers are more willing to
forms. 28
misclassify their workers to save on worker compensation
premiums, which is typically based upon the number of actual
employees the employer has. 29
Competitively, employers who misclassify their workers
gain an economic advantage over other employers who
properly classify their workers. 30 Employers who properly
classify their workers pay for benefits, workers compensation
insurance, and the costs of materials and equipment. 31
Employers who do not have to bear these costs can undercut
their competitors by providing cheaper services and/or goods. 32
Thus, in order to remain competitive, an employer may feel
compelled to cut corners and misclassify their workers.
Fault does not rest solely on employers however. Many
workers wish to be independent contractors for specific nonemployment benefits. 33 Less than one in ten independent
contractor would prefer a more “regular” nine-to-five type of
One of the largest reasons why
work arrangement. 34
independent contractors choose to keep their status is to
underreport their true earnings and avoid taxes. 35 To avoid
25. See Carlin, supra note 23, at 286 (discussing the lack of protections for
misclassified employees.)
26. See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 112 (discussing the personal and economic
impact of employee misclassification).
27. See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 112.
28. See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 112.
29. See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 116.
30. See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 116.
31. See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 116.
32. See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 116 (discussing the advantages received
by employers who misclassify their workers).
33. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 1, at 4.
34. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 1, at 4.
35. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-717, Employee Misclassification
Improved Coordination, Outreach, and Targeting Could Better Ensure Detection
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these types of issues, California, other states, and the federal
government have designed many laws, which often conflict
with one another, to distinguish an employee from an
independent contractor. 36
B. The Common Law Definition of Employee under
Borello
Borello states California’s interpretation of the common
law test for distinguishing an employee from an independent
contractor. 37 In Borello, the California Labor Commission
penalized a Gilroy grower, S.G. Borello and Sons, for failure to
secure workers’ compensation coverage for their 50 migrant
harvesters. 38
Under the California Workers’ Compensation Act, all
employers are required to provide workers’ compensation
coverage. 39 The Act only covers injuries suffered by an
employee, which arises out of and in the course of an
individual’s employment. 40 Independent contractors are not
protected by the Act because they are not considered
employees. 41 In Borello, the defendants argued that they were
not required to have workers’ compensation coverage because
their harvesters were “share farmers.” 42 In their opinion,
share farmers were independent contractors, not employees. 43
The defendants provided the plaintiffs share farmers with a
plot of land that had already been prepared and cultivated. 44
The share farmers then harvested the crop on their assigned
plot of land and the manner and tools they used to accomplish
this task was left entirely to their discretion. 45
However, the Borello court ruled in favor of the share
farmers, and concluded the most important factor in

and Prevention, at 10-11 (2009).
36. See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at Appendix (displaying all states and their
statutes enforcing misclassification laws).
37. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 4th 718,
722.
38. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 401.
39. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 3600(a), 3700(b) (2014).
40. Borello, 769 P.2d at 403.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 400.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 401.
45. Id.
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determining the difference between an employee and an
independent contractor was whether the employer had the
“right to control” the manner in which the work was
completed. 46 The Borello court looked towards the California
Labor Codes to help define “employee.” Under the Code, and
employee was considered to be most persons “in the service of
an employer under any appointment or contract of hire . . .
express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or
unlawfully employed . . .” 47 Additionally, the Codes defined an
“independent contractor” as “any person who renders service
for a specified recompense for a specified result, under the
control of his principal as to the result of his work only and not
as to the means by which such result is accomplished.” 48
Ultimately, the court sided with common law tradition and
focused on the “control” aspect of the employment
relationship. 49
In addition to the control test, the Borello court
acknowledged that the test could not be dispositive in
determining the employment relationship, even if it is the most
important factor. 50 The court recognized that there were many
types of work arrangements and that not all fit perfectly into
the definitions of employee or independent contractor. 51 The
rigid application of the “control” test on its own was not very
helpful in distinguishing these variable and borderline
situations. 52 Thus, the court endorsed several “ ‘ secondary
indicia’ of the nature of the service relationship.” 53
Of all the secondary indicia, the Borello court indicated
that an employer’s ability to discharge workers at will and
without cause strongly evidenced an employment
relationship. 54 The court then provided eight additional factors
46. Borello, 769 P.2d at 404.
47. Cal. Lab. Code § 3351 (2014).
48. Cal. Lab. Code § 3353 (2014).
49. Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Board, 417 P.2d 975, 977 (1970)
(discussing the level of control an employer had in an unemployment insurance
hearing); see also, e.g., Isenberg v. Cal. Emp’t Stabilization Com., 180 P.2d 11, 15
(1947) (same; drawing direct analogy to workers’ compensation
law); Perguica v. Indus. Acci. Com., 29 Cal.2d 857, 859–61 (1947) (discussing
workers’ compensation).
50. Borello, 769 P.2d at 404.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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to consider from the Restatement Second of Agency and from
the Fair Labor Standards Act:
. . . (2) whether the one performing services is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business; (3) the kind of occupation,
with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the principal or by a
specialist without supervision; (4) the skill required in the
particular occupation; (5) whether the principal or the
worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place
of work for the person doing the work; (6) the length of time
for which the services are to be performed; (7) the method
of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (8) whether
or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
principal; (9) whether or not the parties believe they are
creating an employer-employee relationship; (10) whether
the classification of independent contractor is bona fide and
not a subterfuge to avoid employee status; (11) the hiree’s
degree of investment other than personal service in his or
her own business and whether the hiree holds himself or
herself out to be in business with an independent business
license; (12) whether the hiree has employees; (13) the
hiree’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on his or her
managerial skill; and (14) whether the service rendered is
an integral part of the alleged employer’s business. 55

The court noted that similar to the control test, these
factors should not be mechanically applied individually. 56
These factors and tests should be considered “intertwined” and
the weight of each factor or combination of factors would
depend upon the specific circumstances of each case. 57
After considering the many factors, the court held that the
share farmers were employees because the defendants
maintained “pervasive control” over the entire operation. 58 In
particular, the court noted that the defendants chose the crops
to be planted, obtained a buyer for the crops, cultivated the
land throughout the growing cycle, and transported the final
product to the market. 59 The court did acknowledge the
defendant’s arguments that the farmers had control over how
they harvested the crop and had to provide their own tools for
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 404, 407.
Borello, 769 P.2d at 351.
Id. at 404, 407.
Id. at 408.
Id.
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the harvesting. 60 However, the court noted that the farmer’s
ability to control how they harvested the crop did not really
matter because there was only one correct way for the farmers
to do so. 61 Additionally, the court felt that the level of manual
labor exerted by the farmers was simple and did not require
any particular level of expertise to accomplish it. 62 Whereas
independent contractors may have some level of expertise in a
field, such as a plumber or an electrician, the court stated that
the harvesting of crops was considered too simple and involved
“no peculiar skill beyond that expected of any employee.” 63
C. The Federal Definition of Employee
State courts could look to their federal counterparts for
assistance in determining what constitutes an employee. The
federal courts have been asked many times to construe the
meaning of “employee” because the statutes that define it offer
very little assistance in its interpretation. 64 The Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 defines “employee” as one “employed” by
an employer. 65 Additionally, the term “employer” means “any
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee . . . .” 66 Furthermore,
employ means to “suffer or permit to work.” 67
To interpret the meaning of these words, the federal courts
use the “economic realities” test. 68 The economic realities test
looks to see whether the worker is truly dependent upon the
business he or she is employed at. 69 If the employee is not
dependent upon the employer, then the economic reality of the
situation is that the worker is in the business solely for himself
or herself. 70

60. Id at 409
61. Id. at 408.
62. Borello, 769 P.2d at 408.
63. Id.
64. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992).
65. 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(e)(1) (2012).
66. 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(d) (2012).
67. 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(g) (2012).
68. 29 U.S.C.S. § 201 et seq.; see Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366
U.S. 28, 33 (1961).
69. See Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 32–33 (analyzing the factors of the economic
realities test to determine the employment relationship).
70. Id.
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D. The California Industrial Wage Commission
The California Legislature created the Industrial Wage
Commission (IWC) in 1913. 71 The IWC was delegated the
power to regulate hours, wages, and conditions of labor and
employment “in the various occupations, trades, and
industries” in which women and minors are employed in
California. 72 The legislature bestowed the IWC with broad
investigatory powers to accomplish that task. 73 The IWC was
given free access to businesses and work environments, the
authority to demand sworn reports and information, the ability
to inspect records, and the ability to issue subpoenas requiring
the appearance and testimony of witnesses under oath. 74 If the
IWC determined that women and minors in any industry were
paid inadequate wages, forced to work unhealthy amounts of
hours, or subject to harmful working conditions, the IWC was
allowed to convene a “wage board” of employers and
After a meeting of this wage board and
employees. 75
supplemental public hearing, the IWC would issue wage orders
fixing industry wide minimum wage for women and minors,
the maximum hours of work, and the industry standard for
labor conditions. 76
Today, the IWC continues to have the same powers and
duties it had over a century ago, but with additional bite. 77
First, the IWC now has “legislative, executive, and judicial
powers.” 78 Second, the IWC’s jurisdiction now includes all
male employees, not just women and minors. 79 California’s
legislature expanded the IWC’s authority in response to the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which barred
employment discrimination because of sex. 80 Third, the IWC’s
71. Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 54 (2010).
72. Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 324, § 3, subd.(a), p. 633.
73. Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 324, § 3 subd.(b), pars. 1–2, p. 633.
74. Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 324, § 3, subd.(b), par. 2, p. 633; Cal. Stats. 1913, ch.
324, § 4, pp. 633–34.
75. Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 324, § 5, p. 634.
76. Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 324, § 6, subd. (a), pars. 2–3, pp. 634–35.
77. See, e.g., §§ 1173 (duties of the IWC); 1174–74.5 (IWC authority to obtain
records and conduct inspections); 1176 (authority to subpoena witnesses); 1178–
80 (authority to convene wage boards); 1181 (obligation to hold public hearings);
1182 (authority to issue wage orders).
78. Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 1.
79. Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 55 (referencing Cal. Stats. 1973, ch.
1007, § 8, 2335; Cal. Stats. 1972, ch. 1122, § 13, 2293).
80. Id. (referencing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. §
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responsibilities were expanded to be even broader. 81 The IWC
now had the “continuing duty” to assess wages, hours, and
labor conditions of “all employees in this state,” not just specific
industries where minimum wage laws had previously been
problematic. 82
1. The California Industrial Wage Commission’s
Wage Orders
Presently, there are eighteen different wage orders in
effect in California. 83 These wage orders include coverage of
the following industries: manufacturing; 84 personal services; 85
canning, freezing and preserving; 86 professional, technical,
clerical, mechanical, and similar occupations; 87 public
housekeeping; 88 laundry, linen supply and dry cleaning and
mercantile; 90
post
harvest
handling; 91
dyeing; 89
92
93
transportation; amusement and recreation; broadcasting; 94
motion picture; 95 preparation of agricultural products for the
market; 96 agricultural occupations; 97 household occupations; 98
One wage order covers
and on-site occupations. 99
“miscellaneous employees,” which includes “any industry or
occupation” not previously covered by any other wage order. 100
A general wage order institutes a minimum wage. 101 In each
wage order, “employee” is defined as “any person employed by

2000e et seq.).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 57.
84. 8 C.C.R. § 11010 (2014).
85. 8 C.C.R. § 11020 (2014).
86. 8 C.C.R. § 11030 (2014).
87. 8 C.C.R. § 11040 (2014).
88. 8 C.C.R. § 11050 (2014).
89. 8 C.C.R. § 11060 (2014).
90. 8 C.C.R. § 11070 (2014).
91. 8 C.C.R. § 11080 (2014).
92. 8 C.C.R. § 11090 (2014).
93. 8 C.C.R. § 11100 (2014).
94. 8 C.C.R. § 11110 (2014).
95. 8 C.C.R. § 11120 (2014).
96. 8 C.C.R. § 11130 (2014).
97. 8 C.C.R. § 11140 (2014).
98. 8 C.C.R. § 11150 (2014).
99. 8 C.C.R. § 11160 (2014).
100. 8 C.C.R. § 11170 (2014).
101. 8 C.C.R. § 11000 (2014).
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an employer.” 102 Additionally, each wage order defines an
“employer” as any person “who directly or indirectly . . .
employs or exercises control over the wages, hours, or working
conditions of any person.” 103 Furthermore, “employ” under the
wages orders means to “engage, suffer, or permit to work.” 104
2. Enforcement of the California Industrial Wage
Commission’s Wage Orders
To enforce the IWC’s wage orders, the California
Legislature included criminal, civil, and administrative
penalties to all employers who failed to meet the commission’s
standards. 105 Any employer or individual acting as an officer,
agent, or employee of another who violates any provision of the
California Labor Code or any IWC wage order shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $100 or by
imprisonment for not less than 30 days, or both. 106 An
employer who knowingly and willfully misclassify an
individual as an independent contractor is subject to a civil
penalty of not less than five thousand dollars and not more
than fifteen thousand dollars for each violation. 107 Those
engaged in a pattern of these violations will be subject to
increased fines between ten thousand and twenty-five
thousand dollars per violation. 108 Employers who fail to pay
adequate wages may be subject to civil action for the recovery
of unpaid wages, including waiting time penalties and
liquidated damages. 109 Furthermore, the employer will be
publicly shamed: they are required to display their violation
and the actions they have taken to rectify them in a prominent
place accessible and viewable by all employees and the general
public. 110
E. The Dynamex Decision
In Dynamex, plaintiffs brought a class action suit against
102. See, e.g., 8 C.C.R. § 11010(2)(E) (2014).
103. See, e.g., 8 C.C.R. § 11010(2)(F) (2014).
104. See, e.g., 8 C.C.R. § 11010(2)(D) (2014).
105. Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 56.
106. Cal. Lab. Code § 1199 (2014).
107. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.8(b) (2014).
108. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.8(c) (2014).
109. See e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 1193.6 (2014); Cal. Lab. Code § 1194 (2014);
Cal. Lab. Code § 1194.2 (2014) (setting penalties for misclassifying employees).
110. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.8(e) (2014).
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Dynamex on behalf of 1,800 delivery drivers. 111 The plaintiffs
in Dynamex had all been re-classified as independent
contractors. 112 Prior to the reclassification, they were all
employees subject to California wage and hour laws. 113 The
trial court certified the class of drivers, but Dynamex moved to
decertify the class. 114 Dynamex argued that the trial court
incorrectly used the IWC definition of employee. 115 If the court
had instead used the Borello common law test of distinguishing
employees from independent contractors, the class would have
been decertified. 116 The Second Appellate District held in favor
of the plaintiffs, 117 relying upon two prior California Supreme
Court cases to reach its conclusion: Martinez v. Combs and
Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc. 118
1. Martinez v. Combs
In Martinez, seasonal agricultural workers brought an
action against a strawberry farming company and two produce
merchants who the farming company sold their product to for
failure to pay minimum wages under California Labor Code
Section 1194. 119 Section 1194 was enacted in 1913 along with
the creation of the California Industrial Welfare
Commission. 120 The workers of this case had been working
without pay because the farming company had encountered
financial problems. 121 They eventually stopped working. 122 A
representative from one of the produce merchants came to the
fields to assist the farming company in convincing the workers
to return to work. 123 Most did not return to work, and the
workers eventually filed a suit for unpaid wages. 124 The

111. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 4th 718,
721.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 721–22.
115. Id. at 722.
116. Id.
117. Dynamex, Cal. App. 4th at 722.
118. Id.
119. Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 42.
120. Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 324, § 13, p. 637 (1913 uncodified Cal. act creating
the IWC).
121. Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 46–48.
122. Id. at 46.
123. Id. at 47.
124. Id. at 47–48.
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produce merchants filed for summary judgment, arguing that
they did not directly employ the workers and should not be held
liable. 125 The agricultural workers argued that the produce
merchants and the farming company jointly employed them
under the definitions of “employ” and “employer” in Industrial
Wage Order Number 14. 126 The case eventually ended up in
the California Supreme Court, who unanimously concluded
that the merchant-defendants did not employ the plaintiffs. 127
The Martinez court stated that the definition of “employ”
under the IWC wage orders does not require a “master and
servant relationship.” 128 Instead, the IWC uses the phrase
“engage, suffer, or permit to work.” 129 This was a widely used
standard at the time, and would reach irregular working
arrangements an employer might create in order to avoid
labeling a worker as an employee. 130 The court then took the
common law “right to control” test and included it as an
alternative to the IWC wage order definition. 131 The court then
finally concluded that the IWC’s definition of “employ” could
mean one of three mutually exclusive definitions. 132 First,
employ could mean “to exercise control over the wages, hours,
or working conditions.” 133 Second, employ could mean to
“suffer or permit to work.” 134 This meant that an employer
knew or should have known that an individual was working for
them. 135 Finally, employ could also mean to “engage, thereby
creating a common law employment relationship.” 136 The court
recognized the importance of the “IWC control” test over the
wages, hours, or working conditions, but felt that the sole
application of the test without more would “substantially
impair the commission’s authority” and render the wage order
definitions meaningless. 137

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 48.
Id.
See Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 78.
Id. at 57–58.
See e.g., 8 C.C.R. §§ 11010, 11020.
Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 58.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 585 (2000).
Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 64.
Id. at 65.
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The court applied this three-alternative-test and focused
on whether the merchants had any “control” over the workers’
wages, hours, or working conditions. 138 The court concluded
that the merchants did not employ the workers through the
farming company, because the company was not employed by
The farming
the merchants to harvest strawberries. 139
company held itself out as a seller of strawberries, not as a
management company that supervised farm workers. 140
Therefore, the merchants did not “employ” anyone because
there was no level of supervision or control over the company
or the workers. 141
2. Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court
Following Martinez, Brinker reinforced the IWC’s broad
authority to regulate wages, hours, and working conditions. 142
The Brinker court also stated that wage and hour claims were
governed by “two complementary and occasionally overlapping
sources of authority: the provisions of the Labor Code, enacted
by the Legislature” and the wage orders issued by the IWC. 143
The court further emphasized the importance of the wage
orders, stating that they were to be entitled to “extraordinary
deference” and had to be “accorded the same dignity as
statutes,” with “ ‘ independent effect’ separate and apart from
any statutory enactments.” 144 If a wage order and a labor code
were to overlap with one another, the two must be
“harmonized” to provide greater protections to workers. 145
3. Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.
In Ayala, a group of newspaper circulation carriers sued
the Antelope Valley Press for misclassifying them as
independent contractors and other wage order violations,
including IWC wage order number 1-2001. 146 The Ayala court
encountered the same type of issue that occurred in Dynamex,
138. See id. at 71–77 (analyzing the facts of the case under the threealternative-test).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 73.
141. Id. at 76.
142. Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1026 (2012).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1027 (quoting Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 61, 68).
145. Id. at 1027.
146. Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522 (2014).
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i.e., whether a group of plaintiffs could proceed as a putative
class because they were all employees misclassified as
independent contractors. 147 The plaintiffs could only proceed
as a putative class if they were considered employees. 148 The
plaintiffs argued that they were employees under the common
law “right to control” test in Borello. 149
Here, the Ayala court had the opportunity to apply either
the Borello test or the IWC wage order test to determine if the
carriers were employees or independent contractors. 150 The
court chose not to analyze which test would govern, and left
that question for “another day.” 151 Instead the court chose to
use the common law because the plaintiffs proceeded solely on
the basis of the Borello test. 152
II. IDENTIFICATION OF LEGAL PROBLEM
After Martinez, two separate tests exist to determine
whether an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor. 153 The California Supreme Court has declined to
state which test should be used to determine employee
status. 154 Is it the traditional common law Borello test that
looks at whether an employer exercises control over the
manner and means of accomplishing the result desired? 155 Or
is it the Martinez/IWC test which looks at three alternatives:
(1) to exercise control over the wages, hours or working
conditions; (2) to suffer or permit to work; or (3) to engage,
thereby creating a common law employment relationship?
III. ANALYSIS
The Borello and Martinez/IWC tests have similar
characteristics. Importantly, the two different tests contain a
“control” portion. These two “control” tests could mistakenly
be confused to be the same test. The reality is that they are in
fact, two separate tests. To clarify, the Borello test looks at

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 529.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 530–31.
Id. at 531.
Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 531.
See supra Parts I.B, I.E.1.
Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 531.
See supra Part I.B.
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how work is to be done in order to reach the end goal. For
example, a plumber who is an independent contractor of a
plumbing services company can set his or her own hours and
make the necessary repairs and modifications to a client’s
plumbing network as the plumber sees fit. This plumber has
control over the way he or she completes the job without
following an employer’s direction. A plumber who is an
employee of a plumbing services company may have to work
specific hours and follow specific protocols and procedures
when repairing a leak or fixing a clog.
The Martinez/IWC’s control test analyzes whether an
employer controls the way a worker is paid, the hours worked,
and the conditions of the work environment. If an employer
has significant or total control over these aspects of the work
relationship, then the workers will be deemed to be an
employee of the employer. Thus, the same plumber used above
would be an employee if the plumbing services company posed
as an intermediary for payment but gives the plumber full
autonomy over the rest of his job.
Furthermore, the Martinez/IWC version of the “control”
test does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate additional
“secondary factors” of employment such as the Borello test.
When applying the test, the Martinez court looked only at
whether there was control over the wages, hours, or working
The secondary factors played no role in
conditions. 156
determining whether the farming company was the employer
of the harvesters. 157
The court contributes to the confusion between the two
tests by not affirmatively stating which test is appropriate in
determining the employment relationship. 158 The Martinez
court focused entirely on the wage order definitions and swiftly
dismissed the Borello test when the plaintiffs raised an
argument involving it. 159 The court treats the two tests as if
they were completely independent of one another. 160
Additionally, in both Martinez and Brinker, the court
emphasizes the importance of the IWC wage orders and how

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 71–77.
Id.
Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 531.
Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 73.
Id.
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much deference should be given to them. 161 However, the
courts do not state that the Borello test should no longer be
considered in determining the employment relationship. 162
Furthermore, in Ayala, the court further adds to the confusion
by acknowledging the two tests were separate from one
another, yet refused to make a determination as to which one
governs. 163 These cases have caused confusion amongst the
legal community. 164
Based off of the Ayala decision, the court appears to
indicate that either test may be used to determine the
employment relationship if both tests are applicable. When an
IWC wage order could apply to the type of work at issue, the
wage orders apply. If a wage order does not apply, then the
common law Borello test would be applicable.
The IWC wage orders and its statutory authority however,
are applicable to all types of work. 165 The seventeenth IWC
wage order stated, “any industry or occupation not previously
covered by, and all employees not specifically exempted . . . are
covered by this order.” 166 By using “all employees,” the wage
order effectively brings every employee in the state of
California under IWC jurisdiction.
Therefore, the choice between the two tests is essentially
a toss up. Under the holding of Ayala, the courts will generally
use the test that plaintiffs proceed under. 167 This however,
leaves defendants at the mercy of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
will pick and choose the test most beneficial to their case in
hopes of securing a positive verdict. This would create an
unfair advantage for plaintiffs and would jeopardize the

161. Id. at 61; Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1027.
162. See Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 530.
163. See Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 531.
164. See Sue J. Stott & Jill L. Ripke, Perkins Coie, Wage Order—Not Borello—
Applies in Independent Contractor Status Test Says California Court of Appeal,
PERKINS COIE (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/wageorder-not-borello-applies-in-independent-contractor-status.html;
Brian
D.
Lauter, 4 Years Later, Martinez v. Combs Still Confusing, L. 360, (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://www.law360.com/articles/593266/4-years-later-martinez-v-combs-stillconfusing.
165. See 8 C.C.R. § 11170(1)(A) (2014) (stating that all other unmentioned
occupations fall under IWC jurisdiction).
166. Id.
167. Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522, 531
(adjudicating under Borello test because plaintiffs proceeded solely on that basis).
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integrity of the judicial system.
To solve this issue, it is important to analyze each aspect
of the tests and see which test would most reasonably
encompass the needs of the general public.
A. The Borello Test
Borello’s “right to control” test has been the common law
rule in defining the employment relationship. 168 However, the
Borello test itself is not as broad in covering many different
types of potential employment arrangements such as the
Martinez/IWC test. The test however, best addresses the issue
of whether an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor.
“Employee” has been difficult for all courts and
legislatures to properly define. 169 A better approach would be
to properly define what is not considered an employee, which
in this case is an independent contractor. The key word in the
phrase “independent contractor” is “independent.” Black’s
Law Dictionary defines “independent” as “[n]ot subject to the
control or influence of another.” 170 An alternative definition is
“[n]ot dependent or continent on something else.” 171 The
California codes also support this definition of independent. 172
Thus, if an individual works for another person but is subject
to the control or influence of that person, that person is not an
independent contractor and is therefore an employee. The
Borello test searches for this exact difference between the two
classifications. 173
To safe guard against the abuse of this test, Borello
inserted several secondary factors that could also find an
employment relationship. 174 At first blush, the list of factors is
daunting. 175 It could also be considered burdensome to go
through one test followed by fourteen different factors in
support of it. However, these intertwining factors used
together in unison allow courts to extend the reach of the

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 530–31.
See, e.g., supra Parts I.B; supra I.C; supra I.E.
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
Id.
See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at 116.
S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 400.
Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 350–51.
See Buscaglia, supra note 3, at Appendix.
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Borello test or restrict it if an overwhelming amount of factors
go against the “right to control.” The test can reach the
audiences it was designed to reach while still remaining
reasonable. The Borello test is still relevant and applicable
despite the rulings in Martinez and Ayala.
B. The Martinez/IWC test
The Martinez/IWC test is a very broad and sweeping test.
The test itself comprises of three “sub-tests” to define the
employment relationship. 176 Each one can define employee in
its own mutually exclusive, though somewhat overlapping
way. 177 Generally, this broad sweeping test will swing in favor
of workers in the general public because the test does not
require the simultaneous satisfaction of all three tests.
Because the test itself is comprised of three mutually exclusive
sub-tests, it is important to look at each sub-test individually.
1. Control Test
As stated above, the control portion of the Martinez/IWC
test might appear to be the same as the Borello “right to
control” test. 178 However, this control test looks more at how
the employer is conducting their business with respect to the
treatment and well-being of the person, the employee. 179 The
Borello test on the other hand looks more at the details of how
the work is completed. 180
The Martinez/IWC control test looks to see if an individual
has control over the wages, hours, or working conditions. 181
This could potentially reach employment arrangements that
are designed by crafty employers to avoid the Borello test. For
example, if an employer pays a worker for any reason, they
have satisfied the control test. 182 If they set an employee’s
hours of work, they have also satisfied the test. 183 If they in
any way have control over the employee’s working conditions
176. See Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 64.
177. See id.; Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 585.
178. See supra Part III.
179. See Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 64 (defining “employ” in consideration of the
protections needed by the “vast majority” of the state’s workforce).
180. See Borello, 769 P.2d at 400.
181. See Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 64.
182. See id. at 74 (stating that a promise to pay an individual is an offer for
employment).
183. See id. at 48.
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they have met the requirements of this test. 184
The result of this test however, could almost effectively
eliminate the independent contractor from the state of
California. The control portion of the Martinez/IWC test
contains mutually exclusive factors. 185 The test requires
control over the “wages, hours, OR working conditions,” not the
“wages, hours, and working conditions.” 186 This can create
employment relationships in areas where independent
contractors typically do business. For example, a hairstylist
performs services for customers in the privacy of their own
home. The hairstylist may set certain fees for specific tasks
such as hair coloring or a perm, but is open to bargaining over
the price.
The customer, a frugal and silver-tongued
individual, talks the stylist into accepting an hourly amount
for the service they are about to receive. Has the hairstylist
and the customer unwittingly established an employer/
employee relationship? Money has been exchanged as a result
of the service transaction, and the customer did have some
level of control over the “wage” paid to the hairstylist. The
promise of a type of payment for work is considered by the
California Supreme Court to be an offer of employment.187
Typically, this would not be seen as an employee/employer
relationship; however, the literal wording of the Martinez/IWC
test instills doubt into this consideration.
This type of exchange should not be seen as an employer/
employee relationship. Common sense should dictate over
these types of situations. The customer has exhibited some of
the factors of the Martinez/IWC control test, but such a short
timeframe of work does not constitute statutory “employment.”
If it did the customer would be required to obtain workers
compensation coverage, pay for unemployment insurance, pay
for social security benefits, and more. The Martinez/IWC test
broadly protects California workers, but should not have such
far-reaching lengths. Judicial or legislative action is required
to prevent misuse of this sub-test.

184.
185.
186.
187.

See id. at 48.
See id. at 64.
See id.
Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 74.
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2. To “suffer or permit to work”
The phrase to “suffer or permit to work” is a second
possible sub-test to satisfy in the Martinez/IWC framework.
Similar to the control test, this phrase can be broad and
encompass many types of potential employment relationships.
Unfortunately, this sub-test appears to suffer from the same
problems as the control sub-test of the Martinez/IWC
framework. 188 The test is broad, but can be too broadly
encompassing.
The phrase “suffer or permit to work” on its face appears
to encompass any type of relationship where one party allows
another party to engage in work for them. By this standard,
almost any type of exchange or simple service could be seen as
satisfying this condition. For example, if an elderly individual
allows another person to assist them across the street, they
have performed a simple service and the elderly individual
permitted them to do so. Nowhere in the text of this sub-test
indicates a requirement of payment is necessary to satisfy it. 189
This interpretation of the “suffer or permit to work” subtest
could create many unwitting employment relationships. This
could especially be a problem for those who take on volunteers
or un-paid interns. An employer could permit an interns or
volunteers to work for them for no compensation and
unknowingly open the door to potential liability. There is no
statutory limitation to this test and without any form of
correction its reach is far too broad.
3. To “engage, thereby creating a common law
employment relationship”
The last sub-test of the Martinez/IWC relationship also
suffers from problems similar to the prior two sub-tests. This
phrase in it of itself is unhelpful, similar to the American
Disability Act’s dead-end definition of “employer.” 190 The first
phrase “to engage” could be broadly interpreted similar to
“suffer or permit to work” and the control test. 191 Black’s Law
Dictionary defines employ as “to employ or involve oneself; to

188. See supra Part III.B.1.
189. See Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 64.
190. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 12111 (2008) (defining “employee” as “individual
employed by an employer.”)
191. See supra Part III.B.2.
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take part in; to embark on.” 192 Based on this definition, the
employment relationship appears to be created by the actions
of the worker, not the employer. This could cause issues where
individuals attempt to force their services upon another. For
example, if an individual on the street approaches a vehicle
stopped at a signal and begins cleaning the windows, the
window cleaner may have forced an employment relationship
upon the unwitting driver. This certainly could not be what
the IWC intended when it issued its wage orders or what the
legislature or the public intended when they gave the IWC
authority to promulgate such rules.
Ideally, the second phrase of this sub-test, “creating a
common law employment relationship,” could be interpreted as
a link back to the previous common law test, Borello, to
determine the employment relationship. Martinez however,
treated the two tests as exclusive of one another. 193 Therefore,
the test itself is circular, as it appears to reference the common
law test of employment when the Martinez case itself appears
to be the new common law standard of defining employment.
This third sub-test of the Martinez/IWC test therefore spawns
more questions, and gives little answers.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Both Borello and Martinez/IWC Tests Should be
Combined Together to Form the “Dominant Control
Test”
Both the Borello and Martinez/IWC tests reach a broad
range of potential employment relationships. 194 Each test
however, has its strengths and weaknesses. 195 Borello could be
seen as narrower for giving so much weight to the “right to
control” factor, but is supplemented by several additional
intertwining factors for consideration. 196 The Martinez/IWC
test reaches broadly, but could create employer/employee
relationships where none had previously existed. 197
If combined together, the two tests would amalgamate to
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
See Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 47.
See supra Part III.
See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
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a test best suited for protecting the public without over
including certain service arrangements. The test is fairly
exhaustive because it uses all the positive factors of each test
and combines them together.
The test begins with Borello’s right to control test would
still be used as the highest weighted factor in determining the
employment relationship. It looks at the current situation of
the employment agreement to determine if the employer has
the right to control the employee’s work output. Should this
factor fail to find an employment relationship, the next step
will be to use the Martinez/IWC tests to examine the work
arrangement.
The three sub-tests of Martinez/IWC are different from
their predecessor because each sub-test will not be mutually
exclusive of one another. Now, this portion of the “dominant
control” test requires only two of the three Martinez/IWC subtests to be satisfied. Thus, if an employer exercised control
over the wages, hours, or working conditions of an employee
and the employee has engaged in work with the employer, this
portion of the “dominant control” test has been satisfied.
Finally, the fourteen factors of the Borello test will be
examined together to further conclude whether an employee/
employer relationship exists. This relationship does not exist
where the fourteen factors, under the totality of the
circumstances, overwhelmingly push the scales in favor of no
employee/employer relationship.
This test of course has its downsides. On its face, the
original Borello test and its fourteen factors appeared to be a
long and time-consuming process. Judicial time and resources
would be taxed even more by using the “predominate control
test.” Attorney’s fees for litigation and appeals would also
increase, providing a burden on both plaintiffs and defendants.
Furthermore, a great number of lower income plaintiffs would
be hard pressed and to enter into an already expensive process
of litigation if their attorneys had to engage in such a time
consuming test. This would go against the purpose of the test,
which is to protect the very people who would be most
susceptible to misclassification.
B. The California Legislature/Industrial Wage
Committee Should Affirmatively Define “Employ”
Alternatively, the California legislature or the Industrial
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Wage committee should act quickly and decisively define what
constitutes the employment relationship. The merits of either
the Borello common law test or the Martinez/IWC common law
test of employment could be made into a statute. This would
quickly and affirmatively help the courts and the legal
communities decide which test is best used to determine the
employment relationship.
The downfall of this second proposal is the inability to
change any potential additions without amendments to the
law. This would take additional legislative and/or executive
branch resources to remedy. It could also add further
confusion if the present day tests are unable to account for new
types of employment agreements in the future that are possible
because of new technologies. 198
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the misclassification of employees hurts
workers, state and federal governments, and other competing
businesses. 199 To prevent misclassification, the judiciary needs
to decide the most appropriate test for defining the employer/
employee relationship. The recent decision in Dynamex has
created confusion amongst the California legal community as
to which of the Borello or Martinez/IWC tests are appropriate
for determining what is an “employee.” 200 Both tests have their
strengths and weaknesses yet neither has been specifically
endorsed by the California Supreme Court. 201 After looking
closely at both tests, a new and extremely detailed test should
be employed to protect the public yet uphold the freedom of
being an independent contractor. 202 The “dominant control”
test incorporates the benefits of both the Borello and Martinez/
IWC tests at the cost of consuming more time to conduct
thoughtful analysis of each factor. 203 Regardless of the costs,
the “dominant purpose test” should be employed by California

198. See e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., et al., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (regarding the classification of Uber drivers are employees or
independent contractors.)
199. See generally Carre & Wilson, supra note 2.
200. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 4th
718.
201. See Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 64.
202. See supra Part IV.A.
203. See supra Part IV.A.
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courts to prevent further harm to the state’s people,
businesses, and economy.

